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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 08-3400 
 ___________ 
 
 JOSE RONALD VANEGAS MARTINEZ 





 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 




 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A037-010-358) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
 ____________________________________ 
  
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 October 6, 2010 
 
 Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 







Jose Ronald Vanegas-Martinez, a citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals=s (ABIA@) dismissal of his appeal.  For the following 
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reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
I. 
The petitioner entered the United States in 1980 as a lawful permanent resident.  
He was convicted in New Jersey in 2003 of third-degree attempted theft and received a 
sentence of probation.  In 2006, he pled guilty to fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct 
and received a sentence of one year in prison.  His probation for the 2003 theft conviction 
was also revoked, and he was re-sentenced to three years in prison (to be served 
concurrently with the criminal sexual conduct sentence).    
Thereafter, the petitioner was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. '' 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  The Immigration Judge (AIJ@) found the 
petitioner removable under 8 U.S.C. ' 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for having committed two 
crimes of moral turpitude unrelated to each other.  The petitioner applied for cancellation 
of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. ' 1229b(a), claiming that he was eligible for such relief 
because he had not been convicted of an aggravated felony.  However, the IJ concluded 
that, because the petitioner had been sentenced to three years= imprisonment for the 2003 
theft conviction, he was an aggravated felon and thus ineligible for cancellation of 
removal.  See 8 U.S.C. ' 1101(a)(43)(G) (defining an aggravated felony as, among other 
things, a theft offense with a term of imprisonment greater than one year).  
On appeal to the BIA, the petitioner argued that his theft conviction does not 
constitute an aggravated felony because he was only sentenced to probation.  He asserts 
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that he was sentenced to three years in prison for violating his probation, not for the 
underlying offense.  The BIA rejected this argument, concluding that under Supreme 
Court precedent and New Jersey state law, A[t]he imposition of a sentence of 
imprisonment following revocation of probation is a modification of the original 
sentence, not a punishment for the conduct leading to revocation, and therefore must be 
considered part of the actual sentence imposed.@  (A.R. 3.)   It thus determined that the 
three-year prison sentence that was imposed after the petitioner=s probation was vacated 
made the theft conviction an aggravated felony.  Consequently, the petitioner was 
ineligible for cancellation of removal.  
The petitioner now seeks this Court=s review of the BIA=s decision.  The 
government opposes the petition.  
II. 
We have jurisdiction over the petition for review under 8 U.S.C. ' 1252(a)(1), and 
exercise de novo review over the conclusion that the petitioner is an aggravated felon.  
See, e.g., Bobb v. Att=y Gen., 458 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2006).   The petitioner renews his 
argument that the three-year prison sentence was punishment for violating the terms of his 
probation and not punishment for the original theft offense.  He thus asserts that he is not 
an aggravated felon and is eligible for cancellation of removal.   
This Court considers the term of imprisonment that was actually imposedCand not 
the sentence that was statutorily possibleCto determine, for purposes of 8 U.S.C. ' 
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1101(a)(43)(G), whether the Aterm of imprisonment [was] at least one year.@  See United 
States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 790-91 (3d Cir. 1999).  Although the petitioner was 
initially sentenced to probation for the theft conviction, a change of judgment as to that 
conviction was entered on August 3, 2006, stating that the petitioner=s Aprior sentence . . . 
is hereby vacated@ and that the petitioner was to be imprisoned for Aa term of three (3) 
years to run concurrent with@ his sentence for the criminal sexual conduct conviction.  
(A.R. 82-83.)   
The BIA correctly stated that a sentence imposed after a probation violation is 
generally considered to be a modification of the original sentence, and should, therefore, 
be treated as the term Aimposed@ for the conviction.  See, e.g., United States v. Compian-
Torres, 320 F.3d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 
281, 284-85 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Jimenez, 258 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2001).  
New Jersey follows this general rule.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. ' 2C:45-3(a)(4)(b) (AWhen the 
court revokes a suspension or probation, it may impose on the defendant any sentence that 
might have been imposed originally for the offense of which he or she was convicted.@); 
State v. Kearns, 922 A.2d 813, 815 (N.J. Super Ct. 2007) (A[A] sentence imposed after 
revocation of probation should be viewed as focusing on the original offense rather than 
on the violation of probation as a separate offense.@) (internal citation omitted).  Thus, 
despite the petitioner=s arguments to the contrary, the BIA committed no error when it 
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treated the three-year prison sentence as the punishment for the theft offense.
1
  The 
petitioner was therefore properly considered to be an aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. ' 
1101(a)(43)(G), which in turn makes him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of 
removal.  See 8 U.S.C. ' 1229b(a)(3).    
  Based on the foregoing, we will deny the petition for review.  We deny as moot the 
government=s motion to summarily dismiss the petition.
                                                 
1 We have reviewed the cases upon which the petitioner relies and conclude 
that they are distinguishable from the present case.  See, e.g., United States v. Guzman-
Bera, 216 F.3d 1019 (11th Cir. 2000); State v. Baylass, 553 A.2d 326 (N.J. 1989); State v. 
Molina, 553 A.2d 332 (N.J. 1989).  
